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Ignoring Purpose, Context, and History: The Tenth
Circuit Court in American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan
I. INTRODUCTION
All Americans have or will encounter a public display including
religious imagery during their lives. Many of our most recognized
memorials use religious symbols as the primary or exclusive element
in displays honoring heroes who made the ultimate sacrifice
protecting everything we hold dear.1 Such displays are scattered
throughout American communities, which, due to aggressive
challenges to the constitutionality of these displays, increasingly face
a choice between removing the displays or fighting expensive legal
battles brought by advocates of strict separation of church and state.2
In American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals faced such a challenge and held that thirteen memorials that
used a white Latin cross to honor fallen Utah State Troopers
unconstitutionally endorsed Christianity.3 Because the court
misinterpreted and misapplied its own precedent4 in analyzing the
history and context of the monuments and discounted the
importance of the monuments’ court-recognized secular purpose
without explanation,5 Duncan was wrongly decided and should be
reversed.
Part II of this Note reviews the context and history of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Part III details the facts,
procedural history, and holding of Duncan. Part IV analyzes
Duncan; it discusses how the court misinterpreted and misapplied its
own precedent by downplaying the secular context of the memorials
at issue, erroneously discounting the weight of a recognized secular
purpose in creating the memorials and giving too little weight to
Utah’s own religious treatment of the Latin cross. Part V concludes.
1. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1216 (S.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 53, at *77–78 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011). The memorial at Arlington and
Irish Brigade Monument at Gettysburg National Military Park are but two examples. Id.
2. Paul Forster, Note, Separating Church and State: Transfers of Government Land as
Cures for Establishment Clause Violations, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 401, 402 (2010).
3. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1164 (10th Cir. 2010).
4. See Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2008).
5. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1159–64.
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II. CONTEXT AND HISTORY OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”6 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
was originally understood by some Founders and early courts merely
to prohibit a federally established church—one funded and favored
by the government with authority to coerce membership in and
compliance with that religion’s practices and tenets.7 Modern
Establishment Clause jurisprudence only started evolving in the
1940s, when the clause was made applicable to the states by
Cantwell v. Connecticut.8 Seven years later the court decided Everson
v. Board of Education, which held:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church[,] . . . pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another[,] . . . force [or]
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. . . . Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations . . . . In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of
separation between church and State.”9

6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. While a detailed evolution of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is not provided in this article, it is available in Supreme Court decisions. E.g.,
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425–30 (1962). Instead, this article will highlight various
important decisions tracing Establishment Clause history. For a more complete history of the
Establishment Clause, see generally Rodney K. Smith, Getting off on the Wrong Foot and Back
Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
569 (1984).
7. ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 269–70 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Terrett
v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 49 (1815)); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20–21; Smith, supra note 6, at 575–634.
8. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
9. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
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Everson laid the foundation for various later Establishment
Clause rationales, including neutrality,10 coercion,11 strict
separation,12 endorsement,13 and entanglement.14
Even with Everson as a foundation, the Court adopted no single
framework to analyze Establishment Clause challenges until 1971 in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.15 The “Lemon test,” as it is now commonly
known, assessed whether the challenged government action: (1) had
a secular purpose, (2) had the “principal or primary effect” of either
“advanc[ing] [or] inhibit[ing] religion,” and whether it (3)
“foster[s] an excessive government entanglement with religion.”16
Government action that fails any of the prongs is an unconstitutional
establishment of religion.17 Lemon was almost immediately criticized,
even by its author, Chief Justice Burger, and the Court abandoned
Lemon until 1984—when it was reestablished as the primary
Establishment Clause framework.18
Courts have continued to refine and clarify Lemon’s prongs since
1984. The purpose prong asks whether the government’s “actual
purpose” is approval or disapproval of a religion and assesses whether
the government’s intent in taking the action—in the eyes of a
reasonable observer—was secular.19 It is not required that the
purpose be exclusively secular; rather, it is simply required that the
government show a “plausible secular purpose” behind its action.20
The effect prong asks whether a reasonable observer would
believe that the effect of the action advances or inhibits religion or
endorses a religious message. The reasonable observer is deemed to
have knowledge of the purpose, history, and context of the action in
10. McConnell, supra note 7, at 8 (citing Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 382 (1985)).
11. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430–31 (holding that allowing school prayers is coercive in
nature).
12. McConnell, supra note 7, at 13 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 11).
13. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989).
14. Lee v. Wiseman, 505 U.S. 577, 587–93, 599 (1992) (detailing the government’s
involvement in a graduation prayer).
15. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
16. Id. at 612–613.
17. Id.
18. McConnell, supra note 7, at 1–3.
19. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1157 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing
Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2008)).
20. Bauchman v. Wi. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 554 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74–75 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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question, and assesses the action in light of that knowledge.21 In this
sense, the reasonable observer is similar to tort law’s reasonable
person, and is presumed to know far more than most actual members
of a community,22 although he or she is not presumed to be
omniscient.23
Finally, entanglement is generally only found if the government
“involves itself with a recognized religious activity or institution,”24
or provides financial aid to sectarian institutions.25
Despite Lemon’s visibility among the Establishment Clause tests,
the current Supreme Court applies no single test and Justice Breyer
declared in a recent case that there is “no single mechanical formula
that can accurately draw the constitutional line in every
[Establishment Clause] case.”26 Indeed, the court has declined to
apply Lemon in at least one recent high-profile case.27 Some on the
court have criticized Lemon’s prongs as being no more helpful than
“signposts” in identifying Establishment Clause violations.28 In spite
of, or perhaps because of, the current uncertainty surrounding the
appropriate analytical framework for Establishment Clause contests,
at least two circuit courts of appeals have explicitly held that Lemon is
binding precedent and appear to be committed to using the test
until the Supreme Court clearly establishes an alternative.29
III. AMERICAN ATHEISTS, INC. V. DUNCAN
In Duncan, the Tenth Circuit held that thirteen twelve-foot tall
crosses honoring fallen Utah State Troopers violated the effect prong
of the Lemon test and thus were an unconstitutional establishment of

21. Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031 (internal citation omitted).
22. Id.
23. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1158–59 (internal citation omitted).
24. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1260 (D. Utah 2007) (citing
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606 (1971)).
25. Id. (citing Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist., 619 F.2d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir. 1980)).
26. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
27. Id. (noting several recent decisions in which the Court declined to apply Lemon at
all or applied it only after reaching a holding using other tests).
28. Id. at 686 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
29. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that
Lemon still controls all Establishment Clause cases in the Tenth Circuit); Card v. Everett, 520
F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that Lemon remained the general test for Establishment
Clause violations, but that Van Orden controlled some cases involving long-standing religious
displays conveying historical messages in a non-secular context).
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religion.30 This section reviews Duncan’s facts, procedural history,
and holding.
A. Facts and Procedural History
On December 8, 1974,31 Utah Highway Trooper Anthony J.
Antoniewicz was ambushed and killed while on patrol near the UtahWyoming border.32 Lee Perry, then president of the Utah Highway
Patrol Association (“UHPA”)—a nonprofit and nonreligious
organization—learned that no memorial program existed to honor
fallen state troopers,33 and with his friend Robert Kirby conceived of
a memorial to honor the trooper.34 The memorial consisted of a
twelve-foot high white Latin cross with Trooper Antoniewicz’s
name, rank, and badge number in large black lettering across the sixfoot long cross-bar; a twelve-inch by sixteen-inch depiction of the
Utah Highway Patrol’s (“UHP”) official insignia; and a plaque
containing a picture of the trooper with biographical information
placed below.35 After the initial memorial was in place, “families of
other fallen troopers contacted the UHPA” requesting similar
monuments for their fallen loved ones.36 Eventually, thirteen
memorials were constructed (some on private land, some on public),
including two placed on public land outside a UHP office.37
Perry and Kirby were inspired to use a white Latin cross by the
white crosses used in military cemeteries to honor fallen soldiers.38
They believed that “only the white [Latin] cross could effectively
convey the simultaneous messages of death, honor, remembrance,
gratitude, sacrifice, and safety” they intended. The designers
expected viewers to recognize the cross as a memorial honoring
those who had “given their lives to ensure the safety and protection
30. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1158, 1164.
31. 1970 - 1979 / Trooper William J. Antoniewicz, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY: HIGHWAY PATROL, http://publicsafety.utah.gov/highwaypatrol/history_1979/
antoniewicz.html (last visited January 17, 2011).
32. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1247 (D. Utah 2007).
33. Id. at 1248.
34. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1148.
35. Id. at 1150. Images of the memorials are attached to the opinion. Id. at 1165–67.
36. Duncan, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 1248. The UHPA stated that it would use any symbol
the family requested, although no family had objected to the use of a cross, Duncan, 616 F.3d
at 1151, despite the State’s disagreement on that point, id. at 1151 n.2.
37. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1151.
38. Id. at 1157.
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of others.”39 According to the UHPA, the memorials’ purposes are
to: (1) remind UHPA families and UHP troopers “that a fellow
trooper gave his live in service of [the] state”; (2) “remind . . .
drivers that a trooper died in order to make the state safe for all
citizens”; (3) “honor the trooper and the sacrifice he and his family
made for the State of Utah”; and (4) “encourage safe conduct on
the highways.”40 In order to convey the messages to passers-by, the
memorials were placed in visible locations that were both close to the
spot of the trooper’s death and “safe to stop and view.”41
American Atheists, Inc., along with three individual Utah
residents who were also members of the group, brought suit
challenging the legality of the monuments. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, Judge David Sam held the memorials
constitutional under the Tenth Circuit’s revised three-prong Lemon
test.42 He ruled that the “undisputed material facts allow the court to
discern a plausible secular purpose . . . of honoring UHP troopers
who died during their term of service,”43 that the “reasonable
observer” with knowledge of the context and history of the
memorials and the demographics of Utah would not perceive an
effect of religious endorsement,44 and that the use of the cross as a
memorial was not excessive entanglement.45 The plaintiffs timely
appealed.
B. Holding
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court. While it agreed
that the memorials had a secular purpose, it found that they had the
impermissible effect of conveying a religious message, and therefore
failed Lemon’s effect prong.46

39. Id. at 1151.
40. Id. at 1150.
41. Id. at 1151.
42. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1254, 1260–61 (D. Utah
2007).
43. Id. at 1254.
44. Id. at 1258 (referencing Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 777 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
45. Id. at 1260–61.
46. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1158–59, 1164. The court did not analyze whether there was
excessive entanglement.
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The court initially noted that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court is
sharply divided on the [governing] standard . . . the touchstone for
Establishment Clause analysis [in the Tenth Circuit] remains the
tripartite test set out in Lemon.”47 Under the purpose prong, the
court “asks whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or
disapprove of religion”48—i.e., “whether the government conduct
was motivated by an intent to endorse religion.”49 The court reviews
the government’s conduct under this prong through the eyes of an
“‘objective observer,’”50 but does not “lightly attribute
unconstitutional motives to the government, particularly where [it]
can discern a plausible secular purpose,”51 unless the purported
motive appears to be merely a sham.52
The court held that Utah’s action did not violate the purpose
prong. The “consistently asserted” purpose of the State throughout
the project had been one of “honor[ing] fallen state troopers and . . .
promot[ing] safety on its highways.”53 Further, UHPA’s claim of a
secular motive was bolstered by the fact that the design of the
memorials was inspired by military memorials that also used a white
Latin cross, and also by the fact that both designers were members of
the Mormon faith, which “does not use the cross as a religious
symbol.”54 Finally, there was no evidence that the purported motive
was a sham.55
Next, under the effect prong, the court “asks whether . . . the
practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval”56 in “the eyes of an objective observer who is aware of

47. Id. at 1156 (citations omitted) (quoting Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
568 F.3d 784, 796 (10th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a brief summary
of the Lemon test’s prongs, see supra notes 15–25 and accompanying text.
48. Id. at 1157 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
49. Id. (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1030 (10th Cir.
2008)).
50. Id. (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031).
51. Id. (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031).
52. See id. at 1158.
53. Id. at 1157.
54. Id. The court noted that the Establishment Clause only applies to state actors,
which the UHPA is not. However, it deemed the memorials “state action” and imputed
UHPA’s motives to the State because the State had allowed the use of UHP insignia and had
located several memorials on public land. Id. at 1157–58.
55. Id. at 1158.
56. Id. at 1157 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
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the purpose, context, and history of the symbol.”57 This observer is
presumed to be aware of contextual and historical information
beyond what is “gleaned simply from viewing the challenged
display,”58 but is not presumed to be omniscient.59 The court
considers the purpose, context, and history of the action to
determine whether the action would have the effect of
“communicating a message of governmental endorsement or
disapproval” of religion,60 or of “mak[ing] adherence to a religion
relevant . . . to a person’s standing in the political community.”61
In reversing the district court, the Tenth Circuit held that Utah’s
use of the cross as a memorial conveyed a message of religious
endorsement.62 While the State’s purpose in allowing the use of the
UHP insignia and public land was secular, it was outweighed by the
effect of the memorial’s context and history.63 The cross—“the
preeminent symbol of Christianity,”64 and one that, in the context of
the monument, “[stood] alone (as opposed to . . . being part of
some sort of display involving other symbols)”65—sent a message not
merely of death, but of the death of a Christian.66 Thus, the court
reasoned, the reasonable observer would likely experience “fear of
unequal treatment” by UHP troopers,67 and “could reasonably
assume that the officers were Christian police”68 because the cross
bore the official UHP insignia—the state’s “imprimatur”—and was
on public land.69
concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
57. Id. at 1158 (emphasis added) (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d
1017, 1031 (10th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court noted that this
observer “is kin to the fictitious ‘reasonably prudent person’ of tort law.” Id. (quoting
Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031).
58. Id. (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. at 1159.
60. Id. at 1158 (quoting Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 799
(10th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. (quoting Green, 568 F.3d at 799).
62. Id. at 1164.
63. Id. at 1159. The court analyzed the context and history together because there was
no history separate from the context in this case. Id. at 1159 n.11.
64. Id. at 1160 (quoting Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 2004)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1161.
67. Id. at 1160.
68. Id. at 1161 (quoting Friedman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th
Cir. 1985)).
69. Id. at 1160.
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The court went on to dismiss four secular contextual factors
raised by the State. First, it rejected the contention that the crosses’
use as memorials nullified their religious message because the cross
was a “Christian symbol of death”70 and had not obtained a secular
meaning apart from its religious meaning.71 Second, it rejected the
contention that because crosses are common roadside memorials, the
UHPA memorials conveyed the secular message of honoring the
death of one fallen near the area.72 It also noted the use of the UHP
insignia and the size of the cross was unique among roadside
memorials.73 Third, the fact that the designers did not revere the
cross was inconsequential because the State adopted the memorials
as its own, thus engaging in expressive activity likely altering the
effect on the observer.74 Finally, the court noted that the fact that
the majority of Utahns belong to the Mormon religion, which does
not revere the cross, and that only a small minority belonged to
religions revering the cross, did not mitigate the endorsement effect,
because it is not inconceivable the State could endorse a minority
religion.75
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part analyzes the Duncan holding and determines that the
Tenth Circuit incorrectly found an impermissible effect of religious
endorsement under Lemon. First, it misinterpreted and misapplied its
own precedent76 and ignored a likely Supreme Court majority77 in

70. Id. at 1161.
71. Id. at 1161–62.
72. Id. at 1162.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1163.
75. Id. at 1163–64 (citing Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616 n.64
(1989)).
76. Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1033–34 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the city’s name, derived from its history as the location of a “forest of crosses”
used to memorialize those massacred in the area, “militate[d] against the argument that the
symbol’s effect is to endorse Christianity”).
77. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818, 1820 (2010) (plurality opinion). In
Salazar, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts, found that a cross
used as a symbol in a memorial “evokes far more than religion” and was not “an attempt to set
the imprimatur of the state on a particular creed.” Id. at 1816, 1820. While Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined the judgment while deciding the case on other grounds, it is almost certain
they would join the Chief Justice, and Justices Kennedy and Alito in this finding, considering
their stance in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–93 (2005) (Scalia, J. and Thomas, J.,
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holding that the cross, even when used as a memorial to honor fallen
troopers, would convey a message of state imprimatur of
Christianity. Second, it downplayed the importance of the contextual
factors that secularized the message sent by the UPHA memorials.78
Third, it discounted, without explanation, the weight of the State’s
secular purpose contrary to the approach generally taken by the
Supreme Court.79 Finally, it gave insufficient weight to the
secularizing effect of Utah’s demographics,80 especially in light of the
strong secular message conveyed by the use of the cross as a
memorial.
A. The Memorial as an Imprimatur of the State
The Court insisted that despite the context of the crosses as
memorials for fallen state troopers, the cross stands alone without
secularizing features, and by bearing the UHP symbol, would cause
“fear of unequal treatment” on a religious basis in the mind of a
reasonable observer.81 However, in light of its own decision in
Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, which Duncan cites approvingly,
the memorials are clearly secular in nature and cannot conceivably
create greater risk of imprimatur than the cross-bearing city seal used
by Las Cruces in Weinbaum, because the symbols share a context
and history that makes the message of the cross “not religious at
all.”82
In Weinbaum, the City of Las Cruces, New Mexico chose as its
seal the symbol of three crosses, the middle one raised above the
others, with all three surrounded by a sunburst.83 The symbol was
used on city buildings, fire trucks and police cars, fire and police
uniforms, maintenance vehicles, and embodied in a sculpture on the
exterior of the city sports complex and in a mural in an elementary
school.84 Despite its recognition that the cross is “unequivocally”
concurring separately).
78. See Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1162.
79. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592–94 (finding an eighteen-foot tall menorah
displayed just outside the city-county building did not have the primary effect of advancing
religion).
80. See Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1163.
81. Id. at 1160.
82. Id. at 1159 (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1035 (10th
Cir. 2008)).
83. Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1025 n.7.
84. Id. at 1025–26.
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Christian, and that the three cross symbol represented the crucifixion
of Christ, the central figure of Christianity,85 the Weinbaum court
held that there was no religious effect because the symbol “was not
religious at all,” being derived from “secular events” surrounding the
city’s founding.86
The Tenth Circuit in Duncan attempted to distinguish
Weinbaum on the basis of the “secular” context and history of the
Las Cruces cross.87 What it failed to mention, however, was that the
“secular” events from which Las Cruces derived its name—and thus
from which the seal derives its history and context—was the
construction of a rough cross to memorialize the massacre of
Mexican soldiers in 1847, as well as a “forest of crosses” later left to
mark the graves of fallen travelers in the area.88 Weinbaum
distinguished the Las Cruces seal from a similar seal used by another
city in Friedman v. Board of County Commissioners, in which the
Tenth Circuit held that a city seal violated the Establishment Clause
by creating a state imprimatur of religion because including the cross
on the seal was an attempt to honor the city’s Christian history.89
It becomes apparent in analyzing Weinbaum and Friedman that
what distinguishes the two cases—and made Las Cruces’s use
secular—was that in Weinbaum the cross’s context derived from its
history as a memorial. Friedman clarifies that celebrating history by
itself is not necessarily secular, but that the history celebrated must
be secular. Thus, in holding that Las Cruces’s cross-bearing seal was
secular, and “had no religious effect” because it was derived from
“secular” events surrounding the city’s founding, Weinbaum at least
implicitly recognized that memorializing fallen soldiers and travelers,
even with an “unequivocally” Christian symbol, was secular.90
85. Id. at 1022–23.
86. Id. at 1035.
87. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1159.
88. Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1024.
89. Id. at 1034 (citing Friedman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777, 779, 781
(10th Cir. 1985)). The area was conquered by Spanish conquistadors accompanied by Catholic
priests. Id. (citing Friedman, 781 F.2d at 781). Although the court notes that the motto,
“With This [the cross] We Overcome,” also suggested a state imprimatur of religion, it is
apparent that the court would likely have held the seal unconstitutional even without the
motto, because the purported secular purpose was in fact to honor its religious founding. See
id.
90. The fact that the seal was derived from the city’s name, id. at 1035, and that crosses
were used throughout the city in commercial and secular contexts, id. at 1034, is
inconsequential. Those facts derive from the same secular history—the use of the cross as a
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In so doing, the court is in good company, as a majority of the
Supreme Court would almost certainly agree that use of a Latin cross
to honor those giving their lives defending our liberties is secular in
nature. Indeed, three justices, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, have spoken directly on point.91
Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality in Salazar v. Buono, stated
that “[p]lacement of [an eight-foot tall] cross on Governmentowned land was not an attempt to set the imprimatur of the state on
a particular creed. Rather, those who erected the cross intended
simply to honor our Nation’s fallen soldiers.”92 He further stated
that “[a] cross by the side of a public highway marking, for instance,
the place where a state trooper perished need not be taken as a
statement of governmental support for sectarian beliefs.”93 Instead,
“a Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs. . . .
[O]ne Latin cross in the desert evokes . . . thousands of small crosses
in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who fell in battles,
battles whose tragedies are compounded if the fallen are
forgotten.”94
While Justices Scalia and Thomas did not join the plurality
opinion, both have made statements in prior opinions that support
the assertion that they would join the other three justices in holding
that use of a Latin cross to commemorate fallen heroes is not
unconstitutional. In Van Orden v. Perry, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a stand-alone Ten Commandments monument
that was part of a scattered display of historical monuments and
markers spread over twenty-two acres surrounding the Texas State
Capitol Building.95 Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, wrote
separately stating that “there is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s
favoring religion generally, honoring God through public prayer and
acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the
Ten Commandments.”96 Justice Thomas went further in his
concurring opinion, arguing against incorporation of the

memorial. Had the court determined the memorials were religious in nature because of the use
of the cross, there would have been no basis for distinguishing the case from Friedman.
91. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1816–17, 1820 (2010) (plurality opinion).
92. Id. at 1816–17.
93. Id. at 1818.
94. Id. at 1820.
95. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681, 691–92 (2005).
96. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Establishment Clause against the states, and arguing that even if it
were incorporated, the Establishment Clause should be given its
original meaning, which required “actual legal coercion” 97 such as
“mandatory observance or mandatory payment of taxes supporting
ministers,”98 but “[t]he mere presence of the monument . . . involves
no coercion and . . . does not violate the Establishment Clause.”99
Taken together, these statements indicate that there is a likely fivejustice majority that would support the proposition that use of the
Latin cross as part of a memorial to honor fallen state troopers does
not constitute an unconstitutional state imprimatur of religion.
Because the crosses used in Duncan share a secular pedigree with
those used in Weinbaum based on their use as memorials, the
Duncan court misapplied and misinterpreted Weinbaum in holding
that the use of the cross as a memorial in Duncan was religious. It
also becomes clear that if the cross’s use on the city seal did not
create an effect of fear of imprimatur of religion or of unequal
treatment by “Christian police” in Weinbaum—where the seal was
emblazoned on police uniforms, displayed on public buildings,
represented by a seven-and-one-half-foot tall sculpture at the city
sports complex, and painted on the wall of an elementary school—
because of its secular nature, it certainly could not create that effect
in a reasonable observer in Duncan where a mere thirteen crosses
scattered throughout the state carry the UHP insignia, as an integral
and necessary part of a memorial to honor fallen UHP troopers.
Indeed, in light of the shared context with Weinbaum, a reasonable
observer, aware of the context of the UHPA crosses as memorials,
would almost certainly consider the effect “not religious at all.”100
B. The Context of the Crosses as Integral Parts of Memorials
Even if the Tenth Circuit finds that a Latin cross used as a
memorial honoring the fallen retains some religious meaning, despite
its implicit holding in Weinbaum to the contrary,101 the reasonable
observer would almost certainly find that whatever incidental
97. Id. 693 (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)).
98. Id. (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 729 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
99. Id. at 694.
100. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010).
101. See supra notes 81–90 and accompanying text.
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religious effect remains is overcome by the secular context in which
the cross is presented.102
The Duncan court gave three reasons regarding the context in
which the cross was presented that it claimed would purvey an
impermissible effect of endorsement. First, it claimed the cross was a
“stand alone” symbol, lacking any predominating secular message.103
Second, it argued that the cross had not been accepted by other
religions as a symbol of death and thus remained a Christian symbol
of death.104 Third, it expressed concern regarding the size and
location of the symbols, especially those located near the UHP
offices.105
First, the Duncan court erroneously discounted the context in
which the cross is found when claiming it “stands alone.”106 As the
images attached to the opinion illustrate,107 the trooper’s name is
prominently displayed, and the picture and biographical information
are clearly visible (even if potentially merely a blur by those passing
by at 55 miles per hour).108 Further, the use of the UHP insignia
adds to the secular context of the memorial rather than implying
religious endorsement.109 The crosses in the UHP memorials have
never “stood alone” as a Christian symbol, nor been used in any way
to suggest religious endorsement; rather, they have always been an
integral part of a memorial honoring fallen UHP troopers.110 Use of
the UHP insignia is almost necessary—and certainly fitting—on
memorials honoring fallen state troopers. Rather than implying
government imprimatur, the UHP symbol contributes to a

102. Indeed, the cross would almost certainly retain some religious meaning. See Van
Orden, 545 U.S. at 690 (plurality opinion) (noting that a Ten Commandments monument
retains a religious aspect, even though in the circumstances it could send a secular message as
well). However, whatever meaning remains would likely be merely incidental, and merely
incidental endorsement of religion where government action has a clearly secular effect does
not violate the constitution. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (“[N]ot every law
that confers an indirect, remote, or incidental benefit upon [religion] is, for that reason alone,
constitutionally invalid.” (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 771 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
103. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1162.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 1162 n.14.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1165–67.
108. Id. at 1162 n.14.
109. See id.
110. Id.
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predominant secular message by clearly identifying the honored
fallen as UHP troopers.111
This conclusion is bolstered by distinguishing a recentlydecided
comparable case, Trunk v. City of San Diego, which held the use of a
Latin cross at the center of a veteran’s memorial an unconstitutional
establishment of religion.112 The forty-three-foot tall cross (when
including the base) used in the Trunk WWI and WWII memorial sat
alone atop Mount Soledad, just outside of San Diego, California
from 1913 to 1954,113 and was originally an “emblem of faith.”114 In
1954 the cross was dedicated as a war memorial, but it was not until
1989, after litigation surrounding the cross had started, that a plaque
was added identifying the cross as a war memorial.115 During
ongoing legal challenges, the organizers added several new features,
including a bronze plaque, six large walls displaying the engraved
names of fallen veterans, formal memorial plaques each containing
biographies of fallen veterans, and an American flag among other
items. Despite these secularizing additions, the use of the cross was
held unconstitutional under the California Constitution in 1991.116
In order to avoid having to remove the memorial, it was eventually
taken by the federal Congress in 2006.117 While the Ninth Circuit
noted the primarily religious nature of the cross, it acknowledged
that its nature did not preclude the cross from having a secular
meaning, but instead stated that its holding was “driven by the
history, setting, and appearance of [the Mount Soledad Cross]
that . . . sharply distinguish the Cross from other war memorials
containing religious symbols.”118
Unlike the cross in Trunk, the crosses at issue in Duncan have
never stood alone as emblems of faith or been used frequently as the
site of religious services. Rather, the crosses at issue in Duncan have
always contained secular features such as a bronze plaque (and
insignia of the state), pictures and biographical information of the

111. As noted supra notes 91–99, it seems almost certain a Supreme Court majority
would agree with this proposition.
112. 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 53, at *77–78 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011).
113. Id. at *2.
114. Id. at *56.
115. Id. at *56–57.
116. Id. at *8 (citing Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420, 1424 (S.D. Cal. 1991)).
117. Id. at *11–12.
118. Id. at *43–44.
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fallen, and a conspicuous display of the name of the fallen trooper.119
Further, as the reasonable observer would certainly be aware, the
UHPA has clearly stated that any symbol requested by the fallen
trooper’s family would be used upon request, which could not have
been the case in Trunk due to the permanent nature of the cross.120
Thus, unlike the cross at issue in Trunk, the crosses at issue in
Duncan have always been the centerpiece of a fully integrated
memorial honoring fallen troopers, conveying a primarily secular
message to a reasonable observer.
Second, while it may be true that the cross remains a
“predominately Christian symbol,”121 it is “not exclusively so.”122
More importantly, a reasonable observer, even if not embracing the
cross, would surely recognize its non-secular use as a symbol of
death123—especially when used to honor fallen heroes. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has noted:
[A] Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs. It
is a symbol often used to honor and respect those whose heroic
acts, noble contributions, and patient striving help secure an
honored place in history for this Nation and its people. Here, [the
Latin cross] evokes far more than religion. It evokes thousands of
small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who
fell in battles, battles whose tragedies are compounded if the fallen
are forgotten.124

The Court went on to state that “[a] cross by the side of a public
highway marking, for instance, the place where a state trooper
perished need not be taken as a statement of governmental support
for sectarian beliefs.”125 As noted earlier, the Tenth Circuit is in

119. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1162 (10th Cir. 2010).
120. Id. at 1151.
121. Id. at 1162.
122. Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1023 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he cross is an oft-used symbol in other cultures and religions as well.” (citing 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 3434 (Lindsay Jones ed., 2005))); see also 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF RELIGION 9339 (noting that the cross can be viewed as a symbol of the tree of life).
123. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1216 (S.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 53, at *77–78 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011). The district court also noted
that when used as a monument, “the crosses . . . symbolize the cost of war, sacrifice and
honor, and repose in death—specifically, military death.” Id. at 1213.
124. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010) (plurality opinion). The statement
was not central to the Court’s holding.
125. Id. at 1818.
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agreement with the Supreme Court, already having at least implicitly
recognized that the cross, when used to memorialize fallen heroes,
sends a primarily secular, not religious message.126 Thus, contrary to
the Duncan court’s decision, it is likely that the reasonable observer
would perceive a secular message of honoring sacrifice, not a
religious one of a Christian death.
Finally, the court’s concern about the size of the memorials and
the placement of the two crosses in front of the UHP offices is
unnecessary given that the cross is clearly a memorial to fallen state
troopers. The twelve-foot high crosses at issue in this case are
dwarfed by the forty-three-foot cross found unconstitutional in
Trunk, and the vast majority of the crosses occupy no place nearly so
prominent as the cross in Trunk.127 Further, the crosses’ size is not
substantially larger than the seven-and-one-half-foot tall sculpture
the Tenth Circuit found constitutional in Weinbaum, and the
location cannot be problematic in view of the fact that the city seal in
Weinbaum was not even across the street from the city buildings as it
was in Duncan—it was on the government buildings, inside an
elementary school, and on nearly all other city property.128
C. The Purpose of the Memorials
The Duncan court discounted the importance of the
government’s purpose in analyzing effect—contrary to its own stated
approach and that of the Supreme Court—without sufficient
explanation. The court acknowledged that the State erected the
UPHA memorials with a clearly secular purpose, but it did little
more than note that the purpose was secular, that it was not
dispositive, and that it had to be considered in light of other
contextual and historical factors.129 This approach stands in stark
contrast to the importance the Tenth Circuit purported to attach to
purpose in analyzing effects, noting that “‘[e]ffects are most often
the manifestation of a motivating purpose.’”130

126. See discussion supra section IV.A.
127. Trunk, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 53, at *69, *71–72 (noting that the cross
“dominated” the physical setting of the memorial, and occupied the “highest point” in a
“place of particular prominence in San Diego”).
128. Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1025–26 (10th Cir. 2008).
129. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010).
130. Id. (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1033).
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The court’s approach also contrasts with the Supreme Court’s
approach in two recent cases, Van Orden v. Perry131 and McCreary
County v. ACLU,132 where purpose carried substantial weight in the
effect prong and in large part explains the different outcomes. The
five-justice majority in McCreary held that Ten Commandment
displays put up in two Kentucky county courthouses were
unconstitutional.133 The Court gave dispositive weight to the
government’s improper and “unmistakable” religious purpose (both
in the purpose analysis and in the effects analysis) in finding the
displays unconstitutional.134
In Van Orden, a decision issued on the same day, Justice Breyer,
who voted with the majority in McCreary, cast his vote with the
McCreary dissenters. In a separate concurrence, he found a
standalone Ten Commandments display on the Texas State Capitol
Grounds constitutional,135 at least in part because of the
government’s secular purpose in erecting the display.136 While he
refused to base his decision on any single test, he argued that the
display might pass both the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon
test if the majority had chosen to apply it, at least in part due to the
government’s secular purpose.137

131. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
132. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
133. Id. at 850–51.
134. Id. While the Court frames its decision in terms of the purpose prong of the Lemon
test, id. (“We hold that the counties’ manifest objective may be dispositive of the
constitutional enquiry . . . .”), it engages in substantial analysis of effects in the eyes of the
reasonable observer, id. at 869 (“The reasonable observer could only think that the Counties
meant to emphasize and celebrate the Commandments’ religious message.” (emphasis
added)); see also id. at 872 (“No reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the Counties
had cast off the [religious] objective so unmistakable in the earlier displays.” (emphasis added)),
leading to the inference that the effects prong—and the analysis of purpose as part of the
effects prong—played a significant role in the Court’s decision.
135. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681 (plurality opinion). While the court does not describe
the display as “standalone,” and Justice Breyer places some weight on the fact that the
monument is an integrated part of other non-religious displays, id. at 702 (Breyer, J.,
concurring), the fact remains that the display, for all practical purposes, stands alone, as it
shares “no common appearance” or apparent relation to any of the seventeen other displays on
the twenty-two acre grounds where the displays were found, id. at 742 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
136. Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The circumstances surrounding the display’s
placement on the capitol grounds and its physical setting suggest that the State itself intended
. . . nonreligious aspects of the tablets’ message to predominate.” (emphasis added)).
137. Id. at 703.
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In light of its own statements and the apparent weight that the
legislatures’ purposes received in both McCreary and Van Orden, the
Tenth Circuit gave too little weight to the State’s undeniably secular
purpose in choosing to include the cross in its fully integrated
memorial. In McCreary, the government’s unmistakable religious
purpose
was
dispositive
in
the
Court’s
finding
of
138
unconstitutionality. In Van Orden, Justice Breyer cast the deciding
vote in favor of constitutionality—giving the government’s secular
purpose substantial weight.139 However, the Tenth Circuit in
Duncan does little more than mention government purpose in
passing when analyzing the effects prong.140 It found that the
religious nature of the Cross (which is, admittedly, the primary
element of the memorial) overcame the secular government purpose
and conveyed an endorsement effect despite the secularizing features
of the other elements of the fully integrated memorial.141 Further, it
discounted the context and history of the memorials given Utah’s
religious demographics.142 This combined context and history is
arguably even more secularizing—and thus should have made it even
harder to overcome a secular government purpose—than that in Van
Orden.143

138. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 850–51.
139. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699–703 (Breyer, J., concurring).
140. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that
purpose is analyzed in the effect prong, but is not dispositive).
141. Id. at 1162–63.
142. Id. at 1163–64.
143. Duncan provides an extremely poor case for establishing the baseline for when
history and context will overcome a clearly secular government purpose. In contrast, Trunk v.
City of San Diego, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 53 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011), provides a useful contrast
and a situation that illustrates the type of historical and contextual factors that should be
present to overcome an undeniably secular government purpose. In Trunk, it was not the mere
use of the Latin cross as the primary element of the war memorial that overcame an admittedly
secular congressional purpose in purchasing the monument from the city. Id. at *43–44.
Instead, the Trunk court stated its analysis was driven by other factors, including the
memorial’s physical dominance of the other memorial elements, id. at *69, *71–72, its
location and visibility from a major interstate, id. at *71, and its history as an exclusively
religious symbol for over forty years, which then sat alone as a memorial for thirty-five more,
id. at *2, *56–57. Further, San Diego had a history of anti-Semitism and religious
discrimination toward non-Christians. Id. at *68–70.
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D. Utah’s Demographics
Finally, the Duncan court cites County of Allegheny v. ACLU144
for the proposition that a state may establish a religion using the
religious symbol of a minority religion in the state, and thus
downplays the importance of Utah’s religious context.145 However,
in its analysis, the Tenth Circuit once again understates the potential
importance of the purpose factor while ignoring that the Supreme
Court has not addressed the situation posed by Duncan.146
In Allegheny, the Supreme Court held that the use of an
eighteen-foot tall menorah sitting outside the city-county building
was constitutional considering its context (sitting next to a forty-fivefoot Christmas tree).147 The Court stated in dicta that an unadorned,
standalone menorah may have been unconstitutional even though
adherents of the Jewish religion were a minority, thus establishing
the proposition that a government could conceivably endorse a
minority religion.148 However, it is simply unclear what the court
would have done had the menorah been adorned with secular
features, such as a large “Happy Holidays from the City of
Pittsburg” sign across the center of the menorah (similar to the
prominent display of the trooper name on the cross’s crossbar, along
with the official UHP insignia) bounded by small Christmas trees or
other secular items on either side (similar to the trooper picture and
biography), which is a more apt analogy to the use of the cross in
Duncan—adorned by secular features in a state where only a small
minority of the residents revere the cross.
Further, the Tenth Circuit’s approach in understating the
importance of Utah’s religious demographics stands in stark contrast
to the importance the Ninth Circuit placed on the religious history
and demographics of San Diego in Trunk.149 There, the Ninth
Circuit placed particular importance on the fact that the cross at issue
in Trunk stood at a prominent place in La Jolla, a place where being
144. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616 (1989).
145. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1163–64 (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616 n.64, 634, 655).
146. See id. at 1164 (“These factors that Defendants point to as secularizing the
memorials do not sufficiently diminish the crosses’ message of government’s endorsement of
Christianity.”).
147. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 582.
148. Id. at 616 n.64, 634, 655.
149. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 53, at *64–66 (9th Cir. Jan. 4,
2011).
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religious is essentially synonymous with being Christian, and which
had a “history of anti-Semitism that reinforces the Memorial’s
sectarian effect.”150 In contrast, the cross at issue in Duncan is not
even used as a religious symbol of the predominant religion in
Utah.151
Considering the secular history and context of the display in
Duncan, and the secular purpose surrounding its creation, this factor
should weigh more heavily against finding an impermissible effect
under Lemon than the Tenth Circuit conceded.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit is likely to continue to face Establishment
Clause challenges similar to the one at issue in Duncan.152 To ensure
that future decisions are not based on its errors, Duncan should be
reversed. The Court should hold that the crosses at issue would not
create an impermissible effect of endorsement of a particular religion
in the eyes of a reasonable observer because of the secular nature of
the crosses’ history as memorials honoring the fallen dead, the
secular context in which the Duncan crosses were displayed (as fully
integrated in a memorial honoring fallen UHP troopers), the
purpose of the memorial’s creators, and the religious demographics
of the state of Utah.
Steven Michael Lau

150. Id. at *64.
151. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1163–64. Indeed, it would be ironic if a state using the
“preeminent symbol of Christianity,” id. at 1160 (internal citation omitted), to memorialize
fallen troopers was held to be endorsing Christianity where the mainstream Christian world
rejects Mormonism, the state’s predominant religion. RICHARD ABANES, INSIDE TODAY’S
MORMONISM: UNDERSTANDING TODAY’S LATTER-DAY SAINTS IN LIGHT OF BIBLICAL
TRUTH 253 (2004).
152. See Forster, supra note 2, at 402.
 J.D. Candidate, April 2011, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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